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CHARITABLE DONATIONS
"The delightful quality of fraud lies in its infinite
variety . .. ."'
I. Introduction
When Bruce and Nancy Young's electrical contracting business
began losing money, the couple decided that their financial troubles
would not prevent them from continuing to give ten percent of
their income to their church, as they had for years.2 Even when
forced to sell their home and household goods, the Youngs
continued to tithe.3  When the couple finally filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy petition, their financial records revealed that they had
given $13,450 worth of monthly donations to the church in the year
prior to filing.4 The trustee appointed in their case asked the
bankruptcy court to order the church to turn over the Young's
tithes as fraudulent transfers, and the court agreed.5
Despite the pejorative sound of their title, fraudulent transfers
need not be fraudulent. While transfers made with the intent to
defraud creditors may be voided,6 almost all fraudulent conveyance
statutes also permit creditors to pursue transfers made with
perfectly innocent motives, if made by an insolvent debtor for less
than adequate consideration.7 The concern is that if a debtor,
while insolvent, transfers away her property and receives nothing
in return, her creditors may be left without adequate assets to
pursue to satisfy their claims; fraudulent conveyances are voidable
by creditors, or by a bankruptcy trustee, when they unfairly
prejudice the creditors' position.8
This objective approach to fraudulent conveyance law has
avoided the evidentiary problems of proving actual intent to
defraud, and has placed an emphasis instead on the impact of a
1. GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 566 (1940).
2. Pierre Thomas, Clinton Stops Justice Department from Seeking Forfeiture of Tithes,
WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at a8; Laurie Goodstein, Religious Groups Fight U.S. in
Bankruptcy Case, WASH. POST, May 23, 1994, at al.
3. Goodstein, supra note 2, at al.
4. In re Young (Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church), 152 B.R. 939, 943 (D.
Minn. 1993).
5. Id. The Young decision was on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals when
this Comment went to press. Thomas, supra note 2, at a8.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1993); U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1) (1984); U.F.C.A. § 7 (1918).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2); U.F.T.A. § 5; U.F.C.A. § 4.
8. See U.F.T.A. § 3 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 651 (1985) ("Consideration having no utility
from a creditor's viewpoint does not satisfy the statutory definition [of the required value
given in exchange for the transfer in question].").
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transaction from the creditor's point of view.9 While objectivity
simplifies the analysis of an allegedly fraudulent exchange of
property for property, it creates problems in approaching transfers
that do not have a direct impact on creditors. Many commercial
transactions, such as the purchase of entertainment, will be for fair
consideration from the point of view of the transferee, but not from
the point of view of creditors. It seems unjust to ask the transferee
to disgorge the funds transferred, when it engaged in an ordinary
market exchange.
The issues surrounding charitable contributions are both
clearer and more difficult. A donation, by its very nature, is not an
exchange for value.' ° Voluntary conveyances (those made without
consideration) by insolvents strike at the very heart of the policy
underlying the law of fraudulent transfers: an insolvent must be
just before she is generous."
When the debtor has an ongoing relationship with the charity,
the transaction can be complex, with benefits of some sort flowing
both ways. 2 Moreover, many charities perform valuable social
functions. Churches, museums, volunteer fire companies, institu-
tions of higher learning, historical societies, and many other
charitable and not-for-profit organizations contribute to the public
welfare. Treating donations to such institutions as fraudulent
conveyances could represent a significant financial burden to them;
the voiding of charitable contributions as constructively fraudulent
9. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
10. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986).
11. This equitable maxim is widely cited by courts in the context of fraudulent
conveyances. E.g., Rudy v. Austin, 19 S.W. 111, 113 (Ark. 1892); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Aldridge, 210 S.E.2d 791, 793 (Ga. 1974); Birney v. Solomon, 181 N.E. 318, 320 (I11. 1932);
First Nat'l Bank in Fairfield v. Frescoln Farms, Ltd., 430 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988);
Lutherville Supply & Equip. Co. v. Dimon, 192 A.2d 496, 498 (Md. 1963); Boston Trading
Group v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. 1987) (interpreting Massachusetts law);
Lafayette Fin. Corp. v. Cunningham, 143 A.2d 700,702 (R.I. 1958); Durham v. Blackard, 438
S.E.2d 259, 263 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993); Walker v. Loring, 36 S.W. 246, 247 (Tex. 1896);
Brimhall v. Grow, 480 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1971).
This principle is also cited by courts requiring that the debts of a decedent's estate
must be paid before the gifts in her will can be effectuated. E.g., First Security Trust Co. v.
Lentz, 145 S.E. 776, 779 (N.C. 1928) ("[The debtor] has nothing to give away until his debts
have been paid or his obligations have been fulfilled. Equity, which delighteth in equality,
as well as the law, which commands the right, requires that a man shall be just before he is
generous, for generosity ceases to be a virtue when indulged in at the expense of creditors.");
In re Breault's Estate (Soble v. Breault), 211 N.E.2d 424, 434 (Il. App. Ct. 1965); In re
Kovalyshyn's Estate, 343 A.2d 852, 859 (N.J., Hudson County Probate Ct., 1976).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 140-66.
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raises significant public policy questions. Underlying all of these
issues is the question of who should bear the burden of a debtor's
pre-bankruptcy fiscal decisions.
This Comment seeks to develop a consistent analytical frame-
work for the examination of these issues through an extension of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp.3 The BFP decision arguably modifies fraudulent convey-
ance jurisprudence by suggesting that, as a matter of law, a
commercially reasonable, arm's length transaction is not a fraudu-
lent transfer. Part II considers whether charitable contributions
made by insolvent debtors are fraudulent conveyances under the
law as is now stands. This section examines the current state of
fraudulent conveyance doctrine, in light of its historical develop-
ment, and considers the implications of the BFP decision to
fraudulent conveyance law in general, and to the law as it applies
to voluntary transfers in particular. Part III examines the question
of whether charitable contributions by insolvents should be treated
as fraudulent as a matter of policy, and discusses possible alterna-
tive responses to inappropriate expenditures by insolvents. Part IV
concludes that the principle of shared sacrifice, essential to
bankruptcy policy, requires some limitations on a debtor's charita-
ble giving.
For the transactions discussed in this Comment, it is presumed
that the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made.
In many of the situations discussed, insolvency would, in fact, have
to be established as an element of the action for the transfer in
question to be deemed constructively fraudulent.14  Unless
otherwise indicated, all transactions are also presumed to have been
made in good faith, with no actual intent to defraud.
II. Are Charitable Contributions by Insolvent Debtors
Fraudulent Conveyances?
A. History and Development of Fraudulent Conveyance Law
1. The Statute of Elizabeth. - Fraudulent conveyance law
has its origins in Roman bankruptcy law: any transfer made by the
debtor in the "suspicious period" of the 30 days prior to bankrupt-
13. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i); U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a); U.F.C.A. § 4.
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cy was presumed fraudulent.15 The modern laws are derived from
England's Statute of Elizabeth, 6 passed in 1571. Sixteenth-
century English law was riddled with loopholes allowing debtors to
frustrate their creditors. It was easy for a debtor to transfer all of
his possessions to a friend or relative and seek sanctuary from the
King's writ in certain protected areas.17  From this position of
safety, debtors could easily force frustrated creditors to compromise
their claims.
8
The Statute of Elizabeth codified a number of revisions to
sanctuary laws, permitting creditors to pursue a debtor's property
despite a supposed transfer.19 The Statute was designed specifical-
ly to deal with the problem of transfers made with "intent to delaye
hinder or defraude creditors ... ,20 It is noteworthy that the
Statute was not actually designed with protection of creditors as its
foremost concern; a revenue-raising measure, it provided that one-
half of the property fraudulently conveyed would be forfeited to
the crown, while the other half would go to the creditors.2 The
Statute did not actually give creditors a direct remedy against a
debtor's conveyances, being structured instead as a penal mea-
sure.22 The same year that the Statute was passed, however, an
English court, citing the new statute against fraudulent conveyanc-
es, permitted a creditor to bring an action directly to disregard a
transfer made with intent to defraud.'
The best-known case interpreting the Statute of Elizabeth is
Twyne's Case,24 which concerned a transfer designed to frustrate
a creditor's attempt to levy on the debtor's sheep.' The Twyne
court found that the transfer of the sheep was made with intent to
defraud creditors, based on certain "signs and marks of fraud, 26
such as that the gift was general (transferring all of the debtor's
15. GLENN, supra note 1, at 82-83; see also Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at
Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109 (1931).
16. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (Eng. 1571).
17. Available sanctuary included certain precincts protected by statute, royal grant, or
church sanction. GLENN, supra note 1, at 84.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 85.
20. 13 Eliz., ch. 5.
21. Id.; GLENN, supra note 1, at 89.
22. 13 Eliz., ch. 5.
23. Mannockes' Case, 3 Dyer 294b, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1571).
24. 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
25. Id. at 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 811.
26. Id. at 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 812.
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assets), the debtor retained possession after the gift was made, the
gift was made in secret, and it was made pending the creditor's
action. Basing its decision on objective factors allowed the
Twyne court to avoid the troublesome evidentiary problem of
determining the debtor's intentions. This approach, applying
"badges of fraud" to determine whether a transfer was made with
fraudulent intent, continues to this day, having been codified in the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.28
The objectification of fraudulent conveyance law was contin-
ued by the English Bankruptcy Act of 1603,29 which made fraudu-
lently conveyed property part of the bankruptcy estate.3° signifi-
cantly, this amendment included in its definition of fraudulent all
conveyances made without "valuable consideration. ', 31  Voiding
transfers that are constructively fraudulent eliminated the problem
of interpreting debtors' motivations. It also shifted the focus from
debtors' malfeasance to the impact of their actions upon their
creditors. Colville v. Parker,32 a 1608 case under a revised version
of the fraudulent conveyance statute,33 cites an unreported
decision in Woodie's Case for the proposition that a voluntary
conveyance creates a presumption of fraudulent intent.34 By the
eighteenth century, the idea that voluntary transfers were voidable
as constructively fraudulent was firmly a part of fraudulent convey-
ance law.35
Constructive fraud has become a fundamental part of modem
fraudulent conveyance doctrine; the voiding of conveyances made
by insolvents without consideration is based not upon a desire to
27. Id. at 80b-81a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 812-13.
28. U.F.T.A. § 4(b) (1984).
29. 1 James 1, ch. 13 (1603).
30. Id.
31. Id. Debtors should note that further revisions to the English Bankruptcy Act in
1623 made the punishment for intentionally fraudulent conveyances pillory and loss of an
ear. GLENN, supra note 1, at 98.
32. Cro. Jac. 158, 79 Eng. Rep. 138 (K.B. 1608).
33. 27 Eliz., ch. 4 (1585).
34. Colville, Cro. Jac. at 158, 79 Eng. Rep. at 138.
35. E.g., Fitzer v. Fitzer, 2 Atk. 511, 26 Eng. Rep. 708 (Ch. 1742) (voluntary conveyance
from husband to wife, with love and affection as the only consideration, is fraudulent);
Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 477, 26 Eng. Rep. 9 (Ch. 1738) (question of fraud determined
by looking at transaction from creditor's viewpoint); see also Doe v. Manning, 9 East 59, 103
Eng. Rep. 495 (K.B. 1807) (fraud inferred in law for voluntary conveyance, despite absence
of fraud in fact); Lord Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sen. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1750)
(voluntary conveyance fraudulent per se).
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punish the parties to the transaction for some wrongdoing, but
upon the equitable principle that an insolvent must be just before
she is generous.
3 6
2. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. - The statute
of Elizabeth formed the basis of American fraudulent conveyance
law, having been codified by statute in many states, and as a part
of the common law in others.37 In 1918, however, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act was promulgated to modernize and
unify the various state statutes.38 In addition to invalidating as to
creditors all conveyances made with an intent to defraud,39 the
U.F.C.A. also treats as fraudulent those conveyances made by
insolvents for less than fair consideration.4" The uniform act
thereby places constructive fraud on the same level as intentional
fraud. In many constructive fraud cases, the outcome turns on the
question of "fair consideration," which is defined as a fair equiva-
lent given in good faith.4' By including a good faith requirement,
the U.FC.A. directs its attention to the nature of the exchange
attacked. Even when a conveyance is challenged without regard to
actual intent to defraud, a court must consider the good faith of the
transferee.
3. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. - At its height, the
U.F.C.A. was the law in only twenty-six states.42 It nonetheless
had an impact on the drafting of the fraudulent conveyance statute
contained within the Bankruptcy Act of 1938,43 which followed its
approach." The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,"5 however,
changed the law of bankrupts' fraudulent conveyances. Section 548
of the Bankruptcy Code changed the U.EC.A.'s "fair consider-
ation" approach to one which looks for "reasonably equivalent
36. See supra note 11.
37. GLENN, supra note 1, at 79-80.
38. Prefatory note to U.F.C.A., 7A U.L.A. 427-28 (1985).
39. U.F.C.A. § 7 (1918).
40. Id. § 4 ("Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is
or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual
intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.").
41. id. § 3(a).
42. PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 5-13 (1989).
43. (Chandler Act), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.)).
44. GLENN, supra note 1, at 101.
45. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.).
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value."' 6 The primary effect of this change was to dispense with
the U.FC.A.'s good faith inquiry, completing the objectification of
fraudulent conveyance law. The focus had turned completely to
the impact that the transaction has on creditors.
Section 548 provides that a trustee may avoid any transfer
made by an insolvent debtor in the year prior to bankruptcy, if the
debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange . . . . " As under the U.F.C.A., the value analysis tends
to focus on the economic character of the transaction. Good faith
has been removed from the calculation (except when the debtor
has actual intent to defraud),48 other than as a defense that may
be raised by the transferee to protect its interest in the transac-
tion.49
4. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. - The Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act was introduced in the 1980s to harmonize
46. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
47. Id. § 548(a)(2). The key provision of Section 548 reads as follows:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on
or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on
or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation; and
(B) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation ....
Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has suggested that "'reasonably equivalent' means 'approximately
equivalent,' or 'roughly equivalent."' BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1762
n.4 (1994). The Court limited its decision in BFP to cases concerning mortgage foreclosures
of real estate. Id. at 1761 n.3. This general, common-sense definition of value does not,
however, seem inherently dependent on the factual context.
Section 548 defines "value" as: "property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or
antecedent debt of the debtor ...." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A). However, value "does not
include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the
debtor ... ." Id.
48. Id. § 548 (a)(1).
49. "[A] transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for value and
in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any
obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave
value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation." Id. § 548(c) (emphasis
added).
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state law with the Bankruptcy Code and to clarify the emphasis on
economic value.5 ° The U.F.T.A.'s constructive fraud language is
similar to that of Section 548, voiding transfers made by insolvents
without "reasonably equivalent value."51 The inquiry into what
the debtor received in exchange for the allegedly fraudulent
transfer is thus essentially the same under both the Bankruptcy
Code and the U.FT.A.: Did the debtor receive "reasonably
equivalent value"? The comments to the U.ET.A. establish that
the value in question must be commercial in nature: "Consider-
ation having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not satisfy
the statutory definition.
5 2
The inquiry is thus shifted completely from the debtor's
thoughts at the time of the transfer to the impact of the transfer
upon the creditors. The evidentiary issue of intent may be
completely avoided when the debtor gave more than she got. This
transition emphasizes a shift in the policy underlying fraudulent
conveyance law. The Statute of Elizabeth was a penal measure,
which punished wrongful behavior. The modern fraudulent
conveyance statutes are concerned not so much with morality as
with a maximization of assets available for creditors.
B. The Current State of the Law
The U.ET.A. is presently the law in thirty-two states.
53
50. Prefatory note to U.F.T.A., 7A U.L.A. 639-40 (1985).
51. U.F.T.A. § 5(a). The constructive fraud provision reads:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor
whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the
debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the
transfer or obligation.
Id. (emphasis added). The U.F.T.A.'s definition of value is: "Value is given for a transfer
or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an
antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise
made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to
the debtor or another person." Id. § 3(a).
52. Id. § 3 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 651 (1985).
53. ALA. CODE § 8-9a (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to -1010 (1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -213 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439 (West 1984); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 38-8 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-552a to -5521 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 726.101 to 726.112 (West 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 651c-1 to -10 (1985);
IDAHO CODE §§ 55-910 to -921 (1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 740, para. 160/1 to 160/12 (1992);
IND. CODE §§ 32-2-7-1 to -21 (Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3571 to 3582
(West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. §§ 513.41 to 513.51 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 428.005 to
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Another seven states continue to follow the U.EC.A.54 The
remaining eleven states all have fraudulent conveyance statutes of
some sort; while their statutory language varies, most follow the
modern, creditor's-point-of-view approach.55 A few others employ
a more traditional Statute of Elizabeth method, using badges of
fraud to infer fraudulent intent.56
A bankruptcy trustee who believes that the debtor made a
fraudulent conveyance may proceed against the transferee under
828.059 (Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-326 to -342 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 36-
701 to -712 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 112.140 to 112.250 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 545-A:1 to A:12 (1993); N.J. STAT. §§ 25:2-20 to -34 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 56-10-14 to -25 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 13-02.1-01 to -10 (1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1336.01 to 1336.11 (Baldwin 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 112 to 123
(1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 95.200 to 95.310 (1993); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5101 to 5110
(Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-16-1 to -12 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 54-8A-
1 to -12 (Supp. 1994.); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001 to 24.012 (West 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.40.011 to
19.40.903 (1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 10-1A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. §§ 242.01 to
242.11 (Supp. 1994).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301 to 1312 (1993); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW I §§ 15-
201 to -214 (1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 109A (1990); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 26.881 to 26.893
(1992); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270 to 281 (McKinney 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-
3-301 to -314 (1993); WYo. STAT. §§ 34-14-101 to -113 (1993).
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-21 (1990) ("Creditors may attack as fraudulent a judgment,
conveyance, or any other arrangement interfering with their rights, either at law or in
equity."); id. § 18-2-22 (conveyances made with intent to defraud creditors or without
valuable consideration void); IOWA CODE § 639.3 (1950) (permitting attachment of property
where debtor is about to dispose of it fraudulently); Graham v. Henry, 456 N.W.2d 364 (Iowa
1990) (transfer made with fraudulent intent may be set aside); First Nat'l Bank in Fairfield
v. Frescoln Farms, Ltd., 430 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1988) (transfer without consideration
fraudulent regardless of intent); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378.020 (Baldwin 1993) (voiding
transfers made without valuable consideration); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2036 (West 1987)
("An obligee has a right to annual an act of the obligor ... that causes or increases the
obligor's insolvency."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3 (Supp. 1993) (unrecorded conveyances
made without "consideration deemed valuable in law" fraudulent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-15
(1984) (reenactment of Statute of Elizabeth, regarding intent to defraud); id. § 39-17
(voluntary gift not fraud per se, but insolvency may be taken as evidence of intent to
defraud); Everett v. Gainer, 153 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. 1967) (voluntary gift fraudulent regardless
of intent); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (Statute of Elizabeth, regarding
intentional fraud); Farmers' Bank v. Bradham, 123 S.E. 835 (S.C. 1924) (transfer without
consideration fraudulent regardless of intent); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (1986) (intent to
defraud); id. § 55-81 (gifts "not upon consideration deemed valuable in law" void).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40 (1990) (intent to defraud); Blumenstein v. Phillips Ins. Ctr.,
Inc., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971) (depletion of debtor's assets not fraud per se, but creates
a rebuttable presumption of fraud); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-713(d) (1983) (fraudulent transfer
of attached property may be set aside); Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 716 P.2d 180 (Kan.
1986) (conveyance made with fraudulent intent set aside); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2281
(1993) (fraudulent conveyances void); Stevens v. Hart, 356 A.2d 499 (Vt. 1976) (applying
badges of fraud to infer intent).
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Section 548, or may utilize applicable state law under the strong-
arm powers of Section 544.57 While certain substantive differences
among the statutes may influence the trustee's choice of law,
particularly in those jurisdictions in which the law follows a
relatively limited Statute of Elizabeth approach, the primary factor
in determining the most advantageous route to pursue may be the
timing of the transfer. Section 548 applies only to transfers that
occurred within one year of filing.58 The U.ET.A., on the other
hand, permits challenge to a transfer four years after is made.59
Given the requirement of insolvency for a showing of constructive
fraud,' however, it may be considerably more difficult as a
practical matter to attack a transfer that occurred several years
before the bankruptcy than one made on the eve of filing.
1. The Question of Value. - The three principal statutes
61
all approach value from essentially the same analytical frame-
work.62 When the nature or quantum of value given in exchange
for the allegedly fraudulent conveyance is in question, value must
be considered from the viewpoint of the creditors, not the debt-
or.63 This permits the constructive fraud analysis to be objective,
57. "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding
an unsecured claim .... " 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1993). The trustee may, of course, bring an
action under both sections.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). An amendment to extend to two years the period in which the
trustee can reach back and void fraudulent transfers was proposed in 1992, but failed to be
included in final legislation. 138 CONG. REC. H11052-01, H11058 (1992).
This one year window is not actually a statute of limitations. The Code bars the filing
of any. action under the trustee's strong arm powers more than two years after the trustee's
appointment, or after the case is closed or dismissed, whichever is earlier. 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(a).
59. U.F.T.A. § 9(a) (1984). An action may be brought up to one year after reasonable
discovery, even if more than four years have passed. Id. Note, however, that some
jurisdictions also add a statute of repose. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.09(c) (West Supp.
1994) (seven year statute of repose). The U.F.C.A. does not provide for a uniform statute
of limitations. U.F.C.A. (1918).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i); U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a); U.F.C.A. § 4.
61. U.F.C.A., U.F.T.A. and Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
62. In re Chomakos (Allard v. Flamingo Hilton), 1995 WL 669522, *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 13,
1995); see also In re Otis & Edwards, P.C. (Webster v. Barbara), 115 B.R. 900, 908 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1990); In re Bates (Bates v. Two Rivers Constr.), 32 B.R. 40, 41 (Bankr. E.D.
Calif. 1983); In re Curina Int'l, Inc. (Murdock v. Plymouth Enter., Inc.), 23 B.R. 969, 974
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). This Comment will use the phrases "fair consideration" and
"reasonably equivalent value" interchangeably.
63. E.g., Larrimer v. Geeney, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1963) (U.F.C.A.); Hansen v.
Cramer, 245 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Cal. 1952) (U.F.C.A.); United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661,
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and to place emphasis on the underlying goal of fraudulent
conveyance law: protection of creditors' claims. The question is
whether the debtor received anything that has economic or material
value. Obviously, exchanges for money or property are relatively
easy to assess.64 Reasonably equivalent value may also be found
in such intangibles as legal services for the debtor,65or in the
goodwill of the debtor's customers, 66 but may not be found in
abstract non-commercial benefits such as love and affection given
by a family member.67
The value given need not be property available for creditors
to attach and levy, so long as it is economic in nature. In Marine-
Midland Bank-N. Y v. Batson,68 decided under the U.EC.A., the
debtor conveyed real estate to his wife as part of a separation
agreement, in exchange for the wife's waiver of her claim for
alimony and support.69 The court held that the waiver of alimony
represented fair consideration, despite the fact that the debtor
received no tangible assets.7 ° Instead, the Batson court empha-
sized the financial nature of the exchange; the wife was, in essence,
a creditor.7' Her promise to forgo a claim against the debtor frees
666 (D. Del. 1969) (U.F.C.A.); U.F.T.A. § 3 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 651 (1985) ("Consideration
having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not satisfy the statutory definition [of
value]."); Clearwater v. Skyline Constr. Co., Inc., 835 P.2d 257, 267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992),
cert. denied, 848 P.2d 1263 (Wash. 1993) (U.F.T.A.); Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying Bankruptcy Act's "fair consideration" test);
In re Minnesota Util. Contracting (First Nat'l Bank in Anoka v. Minnesota Util. Contracting,
Inc.), 110 B.R. 414, 420 (D. Minn. 1990) (Section 548).
64. E.g., In re 18th Ave. Dev. Corp., 18 B.R. 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (applying
Section 548 to sale of real estate); Brown v. Borland, 432 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Neb. 1988)
(applying U.F.C.A. to exchange of one-half interest in house for assumption of debts).
65. In re Butcher (Martin v. Schledwitz), 69 B.R. 198 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
66. In re J.K. Chemicals, Inc., 7 B.R. 897 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981).
67. E.g., Fitzer v. Fitzer, 2 Atk. 511, 26 Eng. Rep. 708 (Ch. 1742) (Statute of Elizabeth);
In re Treadwell (Walker v. Treadwell), 699 F.2d 1050, 1051 (11th Cir. 1983); United States
v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661, 666 (D. Del. 1969); In re Compton, 70 B.R. 60, 63 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1987); see also In re Wheeler (Butz v. Wheeler), 17 B.R. 85, 87 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)
(Transfer of tax refund from husband to wife in exchange for "past, present and future
faithful performance of ... household duties and parental responsibilities" is fraudulent.).
But see In re Shader (Gayl v. Shader), 90 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (Suggesting that
a debtor received reasonably equivalent value for the gift of a wedding ring to his bride:
"Moreover, Ken received value for the ring-Lucie married him." It is not clear what fact
finding the court conducted to determine that the value received was reasonably equivalent
to the value of the ring.).
68. 332 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
69. Id. at 716.




up his capital, making it available for payments to his other
creditors, or for the purchase of assets that they could attach."
In dicta, the Batson court suggests that "fair consideration for
a conveyance can be a consumable item which in ordinary use
leaves over nothing." 3 This is certainly consistent with the body
of fraudulent conveyance caselaw to the extent that such a
consumable represents, for example, a meal which the debtor needs
to sustain herself. This notion has been criticized, however, since
it might be taken to mean that a "lavish feast" or a luxury vacation
for the debtor would also represent fair consideration, despite the
fact that it would provide no benefit from the point of view of the
creditors.74 Notwithstanding arguments that a debtor's financial
productivity is enhanced by rest and relaxation, the purchase of a
luxury item such as an expensive meal or a vacation in Paris is an
exchange that is economic in nature: the items bought have an
easily discernable fair market value, and are commonly purchased.
This may merely point to the practical limit of the creditor's-point-
of-view approach. If the debtor buys a tank of gas at market price,
it seems commonsensical to treat that as an exchange for fair
consideration, whether she uses that gas to drive to work or for a
Sunday afternoon drive in the country.75
In re Chomakosv6 addresses just such a problem. There, the
debtor had lost $7,710 gambling at a casino in the year prior to
72. See also In re Treasure Valley Opportunities, Inc. (Krommenhoek v. Natural
Resources Recovery, Inc.), 166 B.R. 701 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994) (executory promise can be
reasonably equivalent value, if of financial value to creditors).
73. Batson, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
74. ALCES, supra note 42, at 5-61.
75. Professor Jack F. Williams, in discussing the question of reasonably equivalent value
in the context of an exchange for services, suggests that when a debtor owns an office
building, her creditors would see no economic benefit from the debtor's hiring companies to
perform such services as washing the windows, shampooing the rugs, and maintaining the
grounds. Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as
Applied to Intercorporate Guaranties, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1423-24 (1994). This
example clearly takes too narrow a view of benefit to creditors. When the debtor owns an
office building, the income she receives in rent from tenants is dependant in part upon her
performing her obligations as landlord. If she neglects to fulfill her obligation to maintain
the premises, the tenants may be entitled to withhold their rents. Such a reduction in the
income of a bankrupt's estate would clearly harm the interests of creditors.
Professor Williams seeks to resolve this problem by redefining the law of constructive
fraud in terms of transactions in the ordinary course of business. For a discussion of this
proposition, see infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
76. (Allard v. Flamingo Hilton), 170 B.R. 585 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993), affd, 1995 WL
669522 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 1995).
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filing bankruptcy." The chapter 7 trustee sought to recover the
debtor's losses from the casino as fraudulent transfers under
Section 548 and under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
arguing that the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for his lossess. 78 The court ruled that the debtor did
receive fair consideration, treating the gambling as entertainment,
for which the debtor paid a fair price.79 The Chomakos court
criticized the proposition that the analysis of value should be
limited solely to value from the creditor's viewpoint: "[I]f the
debtors treated themselves to $250 meals each day for a month,
their estate would be depleted by $7,000 but consideration would
still be present."8 The court based its ruling instead on the fact
that the gambling losses were the result of commercially reason-
able, arm's-length transactions." A contrary decision, the court
argued, would place an untenable burden on the casino, which was,
after all, simply engaging in a legal business enterprise. 2
Underlying the Chomakos case is an aversion to placing the
burden of debtor irresponsibility on the casino. Some response to
the debtor's excessive spending may be appropriate; it conflicts with
our notions of debtor rehabilitation and fair treatment of creditors
for an insolvent debtor to throw away seven thousand dollars at a
casino or to treat herself to a vacation in Paris. It is for this reason
that the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge debts over one
thousand dollars incurred in the forty days prior to bankruptcy for
luxury goods or services.83 It is irresponsible for debtors to spend
their money in such a manner, and such a debtor coming to the
bankruptcy court and requesting a discharge from her financial
obligations may fairly be said to come to a court of equity with
unclean hands.
The Chomakos court balked at the remedy proposed by the
trustee. While it may be wrong for an insolvent debtor to fly to
Paris on the eve of bankruptcy, can we fairly demand that the
airline disgorge the money it was paid for the flight? Viewed in
this light, the remedy for constructive fraud against transferees may
77. Id. at 590.
78. Id. at 587.
79. Id. at 584.
80. Id. at 592.
81. 170 B.R. at 593.
82. Id. at 595-96.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 1995).
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be seen to be based on the principle that the transferee should not
be allowed to benefit from the debtor's generosity when other
creditors are forced to accept no payment at all. When the
transferee gave commercial fair market value in goods or services
in exchange for payment at market prices, it seems unjust to
demand disgorgement simply because the debtor was irresponsible
in purchasing those goods or services. This is not, after all, a
question of the debtor being generous to the transferee before
being just to her creditors; it is, instead, a question of debtor
irresponsibility. A remedy that focuses on the debtor's wrongdo-
ing, such as denial of discharge,84 may be better suited to such a
situation, even though it may offer little solace to creditors whose
claims remain unpaidY
The problem with the Chomakos decision is that its emphasis
on the transferee's role in the exchange is unsupported by caselaw
or by statute. The traditional approach has been to answer the
consideration question based on value from the creditor's view-
point.86 Chomakos seeks to exempt from constructive fraud
attack arm's-length, commercially reasonable transactions. While
this may seem like an appropriate equitable defense, it is not a
defense rooted in precedent.
2. The BFP Decision and the Value Issue. - The Supreme
Court implicitly affirmed the Chomakos solution in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp.87 The BFP decision resolved a circuit split
over whether the price obtained on real estate in a foreclosure sale
represents reasonably equivalent value if it is considerably lower
than the fair market value of the property. The issue first arose in
84. Section 727(a)(2) provides that the court may deny discharge in a chapter 7
proceeding when:
[T]he debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the
estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed,
destroyed, mutilated or concealed-
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition ....
11 U.S.C. § 737(a)(2).
85. The problem with applying Section 727 to prevent debtor irresponsibility is, of
course, that the debtor may have acted without intent to harm her creditors. See infra part
III.D.
86. See supra note 63.
87. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
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Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 8 in which the Fifth
Circuit declared that a pre-bankruptcy foreclosure sale for less than
seventy percent of market value is per se a voidable fraudulent
transfer under Section 548.89 Three approaches to the question
arose following the Durrett decision, one following its reasoning,9
the second analyzing foreclosures on a case-by-case basis with a
presumption that a foreclosure sale price is reasonable,91 and the
third stating that the price received at a non-collusive, regularly
conducted foreclosure sale is reasonably equivalent value as a
matter of law.92 The Supreme Court in BFP endorsed the third
approach, holding that, "a 'reasonably equivalent value . .. ' for
foreclosed property ... is the price in fact received at the foreclo-
sure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State's foreclosure
law have been complied with."93
The application of the BFP ruling to circumstances other than
foreclosure on real estate is necessarily limited; the Court cautions
in its decision that it "covers only mortgage foreclosures of real
estate. 94  An analogy to the quandary raised by Chomakos is
nonetheless helpful. The BFP decision suggests that when a
transaction is made in proper form and at arm's length, we may
take as a given that the consideration is reasonably equivalent
value for fraudulent transfer purposes. Like Chomakos, the BFP
decision expresses concern that a contrary ruling would place an
undue burden on the transferee: "[T]he title of every piece of
realty purchased at foreclosure would be under a federally created
cloud."95 The Court emphasizes that the question of value must
take into consideration the circumstances under which the transfer
88. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 204.
90. E.g., In re Wheeler (Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler), 34 B.R. 818 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Berge, 33 B.R. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Thompson
(Wickham v. United Am. Bank), 18 B.R. 67 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
91. E.g., In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Grissom, 955 F.2d 1440, 1445-
46 (11th Cir. 1992); see also In re Littleton, 888 F.2d 90, 92 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1989).
92. In re Madrid (Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982),
affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); In re Verna
(Vema v. Dorman), 58 B.R. 246 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); see also In re Winshall Settlor's
Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir. 1985).
93. 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
94. Id. at 1716 n.3.
95. Id. at 1765. The BFP court noted that many title insurers had already created
exceptions in their policies to insulate themselves from Durrett actions. Id.
1995]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
is made: forced sale will necessarily reduce a house's worth.96 It
is the regularity of the foreclosure sale that allows this reduction in
value to comport with the reasonably equivalent value requirement
of Section 548. The Court suggests that BFP would not apply to
a foreclosure sale not conducted according to state law. In such
circumstances, the factfinder must conduct a traditional inquiry into
the question of whether the value given was in fact reasonably
equivalent to the property sold.97 This idea could perhaps be
extended to suggest that only when, in a Chomakos situation, the
parties are not dealing at arm's length and under ordinary commer-
cial circumstances, will it be appropriate to examine the value of
the consideration given to the debtor. Thus, a court would
examine the question of reasonably equivalent value when the
debtor sells her car to her brother, but not when she sells it to a
dealership.98
The BFP formulation provides a solution more compatible
with traditional fraudulent conveyance doctrine than that offered
by Professor Jack E Williams.99 Professor Williams suggests that
the problem of value exchanged by the debtor for goods or services
that do not benefit creditors can be avoided by recasting the
inquiry in terms of transactions in the ordinary course of business.
Williams argues:
[T]he purpose [of the law of fraudulent conveyances] is to
prevent the unjust diminution of a debtor's estate at the
expense of its creditors. Thus, some, even a significant,
diminution to the estate available to one's creditors is legally
acceptable. What, then, does "unjust" mean in these circum-
stances? It means that the diminution, that is, the damage to
96. Id. at 1767.
97. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
98. The flaw with the BFP solution to the mortgage foreclosure issue is that it is
fundamentally unfair to the creditors. Under BFP, if a $500,000 house sells for $50,000 (the
amount of the mortgage) at a properly conducted foreclosure sale, the buyer gets a windfall
and the creditors must accept the loss of $450,000 of the estate's equity. Although the BFP
dissent objects that such a result is inconsistent with the language of Section 548, BFP, 114
S. Ct. at 1767, Congress has shown a reluctance to clarify the issue. 130 CONG. REC. S13771-
S13772 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statements of Senators DeConcini & Dole). But see 133
CONG. REC. S8050-03 (daily ed. June 11, 1987) (statement of Senator DeConcini) (proposing
an amendment repudiating Durrett, which has not become law). We must regard BFP as a
modification of the definition of "reasonably equivalent value."
99. Williams, supra note 75.
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creditors, arises from a transaction or event outside the ordinary
course of affairs of a debtor-an unexpected harm."
Williams proposes that any transfers made by a debtor that are
habitual and regular would be anticipated by her creditors, and
therefore should not be viewed as fraudulent, even if voluntary.10 1
This solution falls short of satisfaction in a number of respects.
First, it would leave a transferee like an airline, which gave
consideration of equivalent value in exchange for the purchase
price from the debtor, liable for that transaction as fraudulent
unless the debtor flew to Paris habitually. Such a result makes no
sense in an inquiry that purports to look for the adequacy of
consideration. Secondly, while creditors may be aware of such
habitual transfers, they may assume that the transfers bear some
relationship to the debtor's financial condition. When a creditor
agrees to make a loan, knowing that the debtor regularly gives
money to charity, the creditor may assume that the debtor makes
such donations based on her ability to pay. Regardless of how
much a debtor spent on Christmas presents in previous years (while
solvent), a creditor may well feel that once the debtor becomes
insolvent, it would be unjust for her to cease to make loan
payments in order to spend hundreds of dollars on gifts. Williams'
proposition that we depart from 300 years of fraudulent conveyance
tradition in favor of an ordinary course of business rule fails to
resolve the inherent inconsistencies in the subject nearly as
elegantly as would an extension of the BFP approach.
C. Voluntary Transfers
The calculus changes when the transfer in question is not a
commercial purchase, but a gift. Voluntary transfers are among the
oldest forms of fraudulent conveyance, particularly when made
among family members. 2 The close relationship between donor
and donee permits a ready assumption that fraudulent intent may
be present; a gift from husband to wife, which leaves the husband
free to enjoy the property as if it were still his, seems highly
suspicious when it occurs after the husband's financial condition has
deteriorated to the point that the property would be in danger of
100. Id. at 1424 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. E.g., Colville v. Parker, Cro. Jac. 158, 79 Eng. Rep. 138 (K.B. 1608); Townshend v.
Windham, 2 Ves. Sen. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1750).
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attachment by his creditors. Even if the question of fraudulent
intent is removed, permitting such a transfer would be inequitable
as to the husband's creditors, since the husband is still free to use
the property, while the creditors' attempts to recover the money
owed to them are frustrated. 10 3
Likewise, a gift from a debtor to her children or close friends
may be taken as either an attempt to shield the property from
creditors while keeping it within the debtor's reach, or as an
attempt to dispose of it in a manner that is unjust as to her
creditors. Even if the transfer was made with no intent to defraud,
the debtor should still be just before she is generous."
1. Charitable Donations. - Voluntary transfers to charitable
organizations offer a similar dilemma, and one which creates
problems for both the creditor's point of view and the arm's-length
transaction tests of reasonably equivalent value. When a debtor
gives money to a charity, her creditors certainly see a diminution
in the debtor's assets that are available for levy. There does not
appear to be an indirect benefit in such a transaction, as there is in
the purchase of consumables necessary for the debtor's sustenance.
A suggestion that the creditors benefit indirectly because society is
made better by the support of worthy charities seems farfetched;
besides, it is clear that the consideration received in exchange for
the transfer must be reasonably concrete. 1°5
If there is no value received from the creditor's point of view,
what value does the debtor see as realized from the exchange?
Charitable donations may be business as usual for many debtors
and for our society,1 16 but this is not a commercial exchange for
value in the same way as the purchase of a tank of gas. Individuals
may sometimes receive tangible benefits in exchange for their
support for certain causes: if you give to public radio, you may get
103. There is some overlap between such transfers and the conversion of nonexempt
property to exempt property immediately prior to filing a bankruptcy. See Alan N. Resnick,
Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or
Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615 (1978).
104. See supra note 11.
105. In re Minnesota Util. Contracting, Inc. (First Nat'l Bank in Anoka v. Minnesota Util.
Contracting), 110 B.R. 414,420 (D. Minn. 1990); Zahara Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910
F.2d 240, 249 (5th Cir. 1990).
106. Professor Williams would find that such transfers are not fraudulent conveyances so
long as they are part of a regular pattern of charitable giving. Williams, supra note 75, at
1424-25; see supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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a magazine subscription or a mug; if you support a museum, you
may be allowed free admission. It is, however, essential to the
notion of gifts in support of charities that the "welcome gifts" do
not eat up all of a member's donation. These perks are designed
to make giving more attractive, but they are clearly not the main
"consideration" for supporting a charity; otherwise, the exchange
would not be a charitable donation. It would be a purchase.'O°
The Supreme Court has affirmed this notion unequivocally: "The
sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or
property without adequate consideration.""
The decision in 1992 Republican Senate-House Dinner
Committee v. Carolina's Pride Seafood"°  (hereinafter GOP
Dinner) presents an example of just such a transaction. The
debtor, Soon Kojima, gave a $500,000 donation to a political
organization in order to obtain a seat at the President's table at a
fund-raising dinner.Y° It was clear that the debtor regarded this
as an exchange for the privilege of sitting with the President, and
not merely as a gift; he raised is donation from $400,000 to a half-
million when he was told that he would be seated with Vice-
President Quayle."' Kojima's donation turned out be an embar-
rassment for the dinner's organizers when his ex-wife began to
complain to the press that he was delinquent in child support
payments, regardless of his political generosity."' Kojima's
creditors claimed a superior right to the funds, alleging that the
donation was constructively fraudulent under the U.EC.A.n 3
The court took it as a given that the tangible consideration for
Kojima's donation was minimal; there was no suggestion that the
meal itself was worth $500,000.' 4 The dinner's organizers argued
that the debtor received intangible benefits such as "'the value that
107. Such transactions are treated as having a "dual character" for federal tax purposes;
they represent a purchase to the extent of the fair market value of the item received by the
donor, with the remainder of the transfer being treated as a charitable donation. United
States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986).
108. Id. at 118 (addressing the income tax deductibility of insurance premiums paid to
a non-profit organization).
109. 858 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1994).
110. id. at 245.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 245-46.
113. The district court, presiding over the case in diversity jurisdiction, found that
California law applied as to the fraudulent conveyance claims. Id. at 248.
114. GOP Dinner, 858 F. Supp. at 249.
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comes from supporting sound governmental policies,' invitations to
various events, and the opportunity to sit at the head table."
115
The court, clearly disgusted with the suggestion that a dollar value
could be placed on sound government and the President's company
(let alone the idea that such things are for sale), rejected this
reasoning: "Plaintiff's description of the rewards ensuing to
contributors is tawdry and cynical.""16 The transfer was held to
have been made without reasonable consideration, and therefore
to be fraudulent as to Kojima's creditors."7
While GOP Dinner is wholly consistent with the principle that
there is no reasonably equivalent value unless the debtor receives
some tangible benefit, how is it to be harmonized with BFP's
suggestion that a legal, commercially reasonable arm's-length
transaction should not be violated? Under the reasoning of
Chomakos, Kojima's donation might be regarded as an entertain-
ment expense. After all, one would expect eating diner with the
President to cost more than gambling at the Flamingo.
From a creditor's viewpoint, the Chomakos and GOP Dinner
transactions look the same; neither brings anything tangible back
into the estate. 8 The debtor in both cases may feel that he
"got" something from the exchange: excitement, opportunity,
emotional satisfaction, pleasure. The distinction that motivated the
Chomakos court to protect the debtor's gambling loses was that the
money spent at the casino was spent in a commercial exchange.
There is an element of purchase, of bargained-for exchange,
present in money spent on an activity that is labeled as entertain-




118. While one might argue that Kojima's substantial support of the GOP could lead to
legislation that would directly benefit his business interests, resulting in financial benefit from
the viewpoint of his creditors, the suggestion that this is an "exchange" offends not only our
notion that policy is not for sale (A notion that some, admittedly, would dispute. See, e.g.,
AMATI ETZiONI, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 209-25 (1993).), but also our notion of
logical causation. Kojima's contribution may help advance political causes that benefit him,
but the causal relationship between his donation and the economic benefit is indirect at best.
To borrow language from the law of negligence, we might say that while the donation is a
cause in fact of the economic benefit, it is not the proximate cause; the connection is simply




from giving to charity. 9 The pleasure derived from a purchase
(in theory, at least) comes from the item purchased; it is not the act
of buying that justifies most purchases, but the thing bought. The
satisfaction of giving to charity comes from the gift itself. You can
enjoy the museum merely by paying an admission fee and touring
it; people give money to that museum because they derive some
emotional benefit from the act of supporting it. In this sense, the
distinction is based upon the notion of exchange. Chomakos got
some emotional reward in exchange for the money he spent
gambling. Kojima (in theory) got his emotional reward from the
fact that he had given his support to a cause he saw as worthy.
Kojima, however, appears to have been motivated, at least in
part, by the benefit directly resulting from his gift; he didn't just
want to support the cause, he wanted to buy a seat at the Presi-
dent's table. Other charitable givers might also be motivated by a
perceived increase in social status resulting from philanthropy, or
by a narcissistic desire to see the new gym at their alma matter
named for them. One problem with drawing distinctions on this
basis is that looking into such motivations returns the analysis to
the evidentiary problem that an objective law of constructive fraud
sought to escape. How is a court to discern the debtor's motivation
in making the gift, particularly if the debtor is willing to lie in order
to keep her name on the new gym (or out of a reluctance to admit
her egotism)? 2 °
Valuation poses a thornier problem. Even if we accept the
notion that the debtor receives value in the form of emotional
gratification in exchange for her donation, how are we to determine
119. See In re Chomakos (Allard v. Flamingo Hilton), 1995 WL 669522, *4 (6th Cir. Nov.
13, 1995).
A distinction may be drawn from David Carlson's suggestion that some gratuitous
transfers, such as restaurant tips and shareholder dividends, are not fraudulent conveyances.
David G. Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 655
n. 50 (1987). While a diner has no legal obligation to tip a waiter, there is still a commercial
element to the transaction. Waiters expect to receive tips as part of their compensation;
diners expect to pay a tip as part of the cost of the meal. The tip is, in essence, exchanged
for better service. While there is certainly no value here from a creditor's point of view, an
extension of the BFP rule would protect tipping as an arm's length, commercially reasonably
transaction.
Further support for Professor Carlson's proposition may be found in the treatment of
tips an income, rather than gifts, for federal tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a) (as
amended in 1989).
120. These two lies would lead to opposite results, precisely the reason that we want to
avoid subjective inquiry into the transferor's motivations (absent actual intent to defraud).
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whether that value is reasonably equivalent to what was given?
The Chomakos court could assume reasonably equivalent value,
since in an arm's-length commercial transaction, the value of the
product or service is generally defined by the market price.'
When the exchange is one of donation for emotional reward, what
is the fair market value of the emotional reward?" While a
public radio station may offer memberships at $35, $60 and
$120,"z a listener can not necessarily assume that the satisfaction
derived from a $120 membership is truly twice the "value" of a $60
membership.12 4 There is not really a "market price" for a dona-
tion; there is only a recommended gift. Fundamentally more
disturbing is the notion of placing dollar values on the satisfaction
derived from supporting worthy causes. Just as it offends notions
of how government should work to suggest that Kojima purchased
"sound policy," if offends notions of religious belief to suggest that
by tithing a church member purchases spiritual peace.
2. Religious Donations. - These flaws undermine decisions
that seek to protect donations to churches as exchanges for reason-
ably equivalent value. The argument most easily refuted is that the
spiritual benefit of worship represents consideration for tithes."z
The Fifth Circuit considered such a claim in Zahra Spiritual Trust
v. United States, 26 an action under the U.EC.A. 27 The Zahra
court rejected the debtor's argument that the transfer of certain
real property to a religious trust was made for valuable consider-
ation because the debtor received in exchange "spiritual fulfill-
ment."' The court ruled that "[t]he relevant inquiry under [the
U.FC.A.] is whether the debtor received monetary, not spiritual,
121. E.g., BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1551 (6th ed. 1990) (Value may mean "the amount
of money which the property will command in exchange, if sold, this being called its 'market
value."').
122. The problems inherent in applying BFP's per se value rule to charitable donations
are discussed below at infra part II.C.3.
123. WITF-FM Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) fund-raising broadcast (radio broadcast, week
of October 17, 1994).
124. See also In re Newman (Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church), 183 B.R. 239, 247-48
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (rejecting the proposition that an increased spiritual return will result
from increased tithing).
125. In this discussion, "tithe" will mean contributions to a church, regardless of whether
or not they constitute ten percent of the contributor's income.
126. 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990).
127. Id. at 247.
128. Id. at 248.
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consideration."12 9 After all, the essence of a gift is that the giver
makes it because she gains some sense of emotional satisfaction
from the act of giving. If a donor can be said to tithe in exchange
for equivalent emotional value, then all gifts would be supported
by "consideration" of the same sort. Like the GOP Dinner court,
the Fifth Circuit was not about to treat such an exchange as a sale
and attempt to place a dollar value on the spiritual reward felt by
one who gives. 3°
The inquiry becomes more complex when there is more to the
transfer than the mere joy of giving. In In re Missionary Baptist
Foundation of America, Inc.,t13 the debtor, a charitable founda-
tion, gave $17,000 in monthly payments to a church organization in
the year prior to its bankruptcy.132 The trustee sought to avoid
these transfers as fraudulent under Section 548.1"3 The bankrupt-
cy court acknowledged the clear absence of any tangible consider-
ation for the contributions, in the form of either services or other
"monetary equivalent."" Nonetheless, the court ruled that the
transferee gave reasonably equivalent value in the exchange.
35
Reasoning that Section 548(a)(2)(A) "does not appear to require
that 'reasonably equivalent value' be a monetary equivalent," '36
the court held that the debtor, as a non-profit organization
incorporated in part for the purpose of making charitable contribu-
tions, received value in the form of good will, preservation of
129. Id. at 249.
130. See also Newman, 183 B.R. at 246 n. 10 ("The defendant made some vague
references to the debt that the debtors owed to God. However, any such obligation is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to determine. Assuming the debtors feel so obligated,
the obligation does not constitute a debt as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Code.").
131. (Wilson v. Upreach Ministries), 24 B.R. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
132. Im at 974-75.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 979 ("No one can argue that MBFA [the debtor] received a monetary
equivalent for the payments which were made by it to Upreach Ministries during that twelve
month period. There was no proof whatsoever that [the transferee] performed any services
which arguably could constitute 'reasonably equivalent value' to MBFA. Certainly Upreach
Ministries furnished nothing tangible to MBFA.").
135. Id.
136. 24 B.R. at 979.
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employee morale, t37 and the fact of compliance with the mandate
of its incorporators.
138
While it is probably true that these factors influenced the
debtor's decision to make the contributions despite its insolvency,
they do not appear to represent value as traditionally applied in
fraudulent conveyance cases. It is highly questionable, in fact,
whether the debtor can truly be said to have received these benefits
from the transferee; making the donations may have made the
debtor's officers and employees feel good, but that does not make
this transaction an exchange of money for good feelings. More
importantly, there is no basis for treating good feelings as reason-
ably equivalent value, contrary to the Missionary Baptist court's
conclusion, Section 548(d)(2)(A) defines value as "property, or
satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor .. ..""9 While "reasonably equivalent" is not expressly
defined as monetary equivalent, it seems clear that the value
contemplated is economic value; the consideration the Missionary
Baptist court uses as a basis for its decision is not "property" in any
conventional understanding of the term.
A similar analytical problem arises when the debtor receives
benefits from membership in the charity to which she gives."
The debtors in In re Moses t ' were parishioners who gave approx-
imately $4,700 to their church in the year preceding their bankrupt-
cy.112  The bankruptcy court denied the trustee's motion to void
the donations as fraudulent transfers, holding that the debtors
137. It is ironic that while the Missionary Baptist transfers were found not to be
fraudulent in part due to the debtor's need to make them in order to maintain employee
morale, separate litigation makes clear that the debtor was so zealous in its charitable
donations that it overdrew its bank accounts and wrote bad payroll checks to its employees.
In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., 667 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1982).
138. Missionary Baptist, 24 B.R. at 979.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1993). "Satisfaction" in this definition clearly refers to
satisfaction "of a present or antecedent debt," not to emotional satisfaction.
140. An interesting contrast may be found in Tracy v. Hahn, 940 F.2d 1536 (Table), 1991
WL 148926 (9th Cir. 1991), a case not directly involving fraudulent conveyance issues. The
Tracys, defendants in a criminal action, were "High Priest and Priestess of The Church of
the Most High Goddess, a 'hedonistic' religion whose principal rites require adherents to
tithe and engage in oral and vaginal sex with the clergy." 1991 WL 148926 at **1. They
were convicted of keeping a house of ill repute. One can only speculate whether a member
of The Church of the Most High Goddess could successfully argue that he or she received
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for his or her tithing.
141. (Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc.), 59 B.R. 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1986).
142. Id. at 816.
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received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for their tithes,
in the form of counseling services, personal contacts, and the
provision of utilities during church services.143 The court conclud-
ed that while "nothing tangible was given to the Debtors in
exchange for the tithes and offerings," 1" the services provided by
the church represented property.145 The debtors had availed
themselves of free marriage counseling, which the court reasoned
was the equivalent of expensive private counseling.1" The church
also supplied the debtors with informal contacts with potential
employees for their business, and with information on develop-
ments in the building and construction trades, presumably through
the debtors' contacts with other members of the congregation.
14 7
The debtors also received the benefit of heating, air conditioning,
and electricity while in the church building for services. The court
held that, since the church must pay for such utilities, and since it
relies on tithes and offerings to cover these operating expenses, the
debtors tithed in exchange for the enjoyment of these utilities.'
48
Unlike the value cited by the court in Missionary Baptist, the
items of reasonably equivalent value identified by the Moses court
have an identifiable value; one could calculate the cost of 80 hours
of professional counseling or the pro-rated cost of utility service
expended per worshiper present during each church service. Like
the Missionary Baptist court, however, the Moses court bases its
conclusion on the highly dubious proposition that the benefits
received by the debtors from the church were given in exchange for
the donations in question. 49 It is certainly true that the church
provided utility service while the debtors were inside. However,
their receipt of such service was not dependent upon their tithing,
or upon the amount of their tithing. The same heating, air
conditioning, and electricity benefited everyone in the building at
143. Id. at 818-20.
144. Id. at 818.
145. Id.
146. This counseling was of value to the debtors, since they would have had to pay for
such counseling had they sought it out from a private counselor, and also because it resulted
in actual benefit to them: "The Debtors testified at trial that such services assisted them in
getting through an extremely difficult period of their lives prior to bankruptcy." 59 B.R. at
818.
147. Id. at 819. The Moses court does not clearly explain the nature of this "informal
counseling."
148. Id. at 818-19.
149. Id. at 818.
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the time, regardless of whether they had given money to the
church. Likewise, the informal business contacts that the debtors
enjoyed as members of the congregation were incidental benefits
of membership, not value given to the debtors by the church. The
debtors had the opportunity to meet other churchgoers regardless
of how much they gave. These informal contacts might be likened
to the debtor's opportunity to eat with the President in GOP
Dinner; while such social contacts might be of some value to the
debtors, they do not have an ascertainable dollar value that can be
compared to the amount of the donation to determine reasonable
equivalence.
The counseling services cited by the Moses court more closely
approximate the sort of consideration for which a reasonably
equivalent value analysis is appropriate. Similar counseling by a
professional in private practice1 5° would have a specific cost. One
might argue that the counseling received by the debtors is "worth"
whatever it would have cost them to obtain such counseling on the
open market. The flaw with the conclusion that such services are
reasonably equivalent value is in the Moses court's assumption that
there was an exchange. It appears that the church provided free
counseling to its members;"' all members were asked to make
contributions in order to help defray the cost of operating the
church.152 There was no suggestion that all church members
received counseling, or that those who did avail themselves of the
counseling services gave more as a consequence. While the
church's ability to provide such services was undoubtedly depen-
dant upon the generosity of its congregation, the church was not
"selling" those services in exchange for tithes.'53 It is likely that,
for tax and liability reasons, neither the church nor the debtors
would want the provision of counseling services to parishioners to
be treated as the sale of professional services) 54
150. The Moses court describes the training of the counselors at the debtors' church as
"theological." Id. at 818. The court clearly assumes that the counseling received by the
debtors was equivalent to that which they would have received had they sought private
counseling.
151. Moses, 59 B.R. at 816.
152. Id.
153. See also Newman, 183 B.R. at 248.
154. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 933 (1989)
(charitable contributions may not be deducted from income if made in exchange for specific
services); I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (West 1994) (exempting from taxation religious and charitable
institutions); see infra part III.A.2 (charitable immunity).
[Vol. 100:1
CHARITABLE DONATIONS
Both the Missionary Baptist and the Moses decisions are
criticized by the District Court for the District of Minnesota in In
re Young.155 The debtors in Young donated $13,450 in tithes to
their church in the year preceeding their bankruptcy.1 56  The
trustee sought to recover the transfers as fraudulent under Section
548.' The court held that the tithes were constructively fraudu-
lent, ruling that "[a] debtor cannot receive reasonably equivalent
value for payments that are made out of a sense of moral obliga-
tion rather than legal obligation. '15' Applying the principle that
fraudulent conveyance law is intended "to prevent the debtor from
depleting the resources available to creditors through gratuitous
transfers of the debtor's property,"1 59 the court concluded that
religious donations, like interfamilial gifts, "are clearly avoid-
able. ,
160
The Young court rejected the church's argument that the
debtors received reasonably equivalent value through the opportu-
nity to claim a tax deduction for their tithes.16 Under the
Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 162 a
charitable donation may not be taken as a deduction from income
for tax purposes if it is made at a fixed amount in exchange for
specific services. 163 The Young court reasoned that, "by defini-
tion if a charitable contribution is deductible, i.e., without adequate
consideration, it cannot be in exchange for 'reasonably equivalent
value,"' 1  Moreover, the value of a tax deduction for a charita-
ble contribution can not be reasonably equivalent in value to the
deduction itself. Such an argument presupposes that the income
tax rates are so high as to be equivalent in value to the income
being taxed."6
155. (Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church), 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993).
156. Id. at 943. The Youngs continued to give ten percent of their income to their
church, even as their electrical contracting business faltered. Laurie Goodstein, Religious
Groups Fight U.S. in Bankruptcy Case, WASH. POST, May 23, 1994, at al.
157. Young, 152 B.R. at 944.
158. Id. at 948.




162. 490 U.S. 680, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 933 (1989).
163. Id. at 691-92.
164. Young, 152 B.R. at 949.
165. The absurdity of arguments by tax protestors that this is so is evidenced by the fact
that citizens of the United States have one of the lowest tax burdens in the industrialized
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The Young court further rejected the proposition that any
value that the debtors may have received was in exchange for their
donations. Given that the church provided support and services to
all regardless of contribution, the provision of such benefits to the
debtors can not be in exchange for their tithes."6
3. Application of the BFP Approach to Charitable Donations.
- Traditional fraudulent conveyance doctrine clearly offers no
solace to the churches in these cases. As the Young court
concluded, the rulings on behalf of the transferees in Missionary
Baptist and Moses appear to be the result of courts misapplying the
law in order to reach the "right" conclusion.167 It is not clear,
however, that the application of BFP,16 by extending its ruling
to all arm's-length commercially reasonable transactions provides
any protection for the recipients of charitable contributions from
insolvents.
An extension of BFP that would cover circumstances such as
those faced by the Chomakos court169 would not necessarily help
charitable institutions that have received allegedly fraudulent
conveyances. Essential to BFP's per se value rule is the notion of
market exchange; the price obtained at a foreclosure sale is
reasonably equivalent value because it is the product of market
forces. 7' The BFP transaction is not fraudulent because it is a
commercial exchange, conducted at arm's length in a customary
and commercially reasonable manner.
Such a reading of BFP would not apply to charitable dona-
tions. Essential to the idea of a donation is that it is not a
commercial exchange.171  A rule that protects arm's-length
commercial transactions does not, by its plain language, extend to
gratuitous transfers, whether made in a personal context (such as
world. Martin J. McHahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 464 (1993) ("No important
industrialized democracy has a lower tax burden, and many have significantly higher taxes.")
(citing LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLE AMONG
JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA 269 (1992)).
166. Young, 152 B.R. at 949; see also Newman, 183 B.R. 239 (the "factual twin" of the
Young case, expressly following the Young court's analysis and conclusions).
167. Young, 152 B.R. at 949-50.
168. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994); see supra part II.B.2.
169. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
170. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1762.
171. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 933 (1989);
United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986).
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gifts to family members) or in a formal, "business" context (such as
contributions to a charity). Charitable contributions certainly can
be conducted at arm's length; many donations are made to causes
by individuals whose only contact with the charity is the gift. An
arm's-length transaction does not, however, inherently render an
exchange commercial in nature. The extended BFP rule establishes
that the value received in a commercially reasonable exchange is
reasonably equivalent to the price paid.172 This does not suggest
that all reasonable exchanges are per se exempt from attack under
Section 548. Rather, BFP establishes a rule regarding the equiva-
lency of value, where an exchange has been made for value, but the
relationship between the value received and the value given is in
question. As discussed above,173 the fatal flaw in the arguments
offered by the churches in Zahara, Missionary Baptist, Moses, and
Young is that no value is received in exchange for a purely
gratuitous donation. There are no grounds for applying the
extended BFP value rule when there in no value given.
To extend BFP to the point where it would offer protection to
charities that receive donations from insolvents, it would have to be
read as automatically exempting any bona fide, legal transaction
from fraudulent conveyance attack (absent intent to defraud).
There is some basis in BFP for the proposition that charitable
contributions are per se not fraudulent. The BFP Court points to
the ancient pedigree of foreclosure law and to the 400 years of
peaceful coexistence between fraudulent conveyance and foreclo-
sure doctrines."4 Tithing is likewise an ancient institution, which
has not been characterized as constructive fraud until relatively
recently.175 It could be argued in either context that departure
from such a longstanding tradition requires clear legislative
guidance. This line of reasoning certainly supports an exemption
for tithes, but is not sufficient as a sole justification, given the plain
language of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. This argument is
also weakened by the trend in the law away from special protection
172. See supra part II.B.2.
173. See supra part II.C.2.
174. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
175. It appears that Missionary Baptist, 24 B.R. 973, decided in 1982, is the earliest
reported case dealing with an attack on a charitable contribution under fraudulent
conveyance law involving an independent constructive fraud claim based on an absence of
consideration. (It is noteworthy that the trustee in Missionary Baptist also alleged actual
fraud. Id. at 974.)
1995]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
for charities, 76 and by the proposition that the antiquity of a
tradition does not necessarily prove its contemporary relevance.'
77
The BFP Court also emphasized the burden that voiding a
foreclosure under Section 548 would place on the buyer. 78 This
departure from the traditional emphasis on objectivity 79 might
support a conclusion that it would be appropriate to exempt
charitable donations from fraudulent conveyance attack because of
the potential burden on the charity. Unquestionably, few non-
profit organizations have cash reserves sufficient to disgorge large
donations without a significant financial crisis. It is not clear, for
example, how large the church in Young is; most community
churches would be hard pressed to produce $14,450 in order to pay
a judgment. An approach that considers the burden on the
transferee would certainly protect non-profit charities from
substantial liability.
A comparison to the Chomakos case" is illuminating here.
The defendant casino in Chomakos is presumably in a better
position to bear the loss of disgorging the allegedly fraudulent
transfer than a charity. Nonetheless, the protection of the BFP
rule is extended more easily to Chomakos than to a case like
Young. What distinguishes Chomakos and BFP from the church
cases is that when Chomakos and BFP considered the burden
placed on the transferee, they focused on the hampering of business
operations, not on the transferee's financial ability to disgorge the
funds in question.18' To extend BFP to the point where it would
protect any transferee without the funds to conveniently repay the
transfer in question would render fraudulent conveyance law
hopelessly subjective, resulting in an inappropriate consideration of
the transferee's overall financial status. The relevant issue in a
fraudulent conveyance action is the transfer itself; the point of
constructive fraud is to remove consideration of the subjective
aspects of the exchange."8 To extend BFP to the point where
176. See infra part III.A.2.
177. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 629 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
178. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
179. See supra part II.A.
180. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
181. See BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765 (citing the title insurance industry's response to the
Durret decision); Chomakos, 170 B.R. at 596 (rejecting application of Section 548 due to
potential "harm to society's interest in maintaining the integrity of legal and commercial
transactions .... ").
182. See supra part II.A.
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charitable contributions are per se made for reasonably equivalent
value would represent a substantial step backwards in fraudulent
conveyance doctrine.
III. Should Charitable Contributions by Insolvent Debtors Be
Fraudulent Conveyances?
The confines of traditional fraudulent conveyance doctrine
leave little room for the judicial protection of charities. If the
recipients of charitable contributions hope to be shielded from
fraudulent transfer actions, their relief must come from the
legislature. It has in fact been proposed that the Bankruptcy Code
be amended to exempt tithes from fraudulent conveyance at-
tack.1" Of course, such a congressionally-created federal immuni-
ty would apply only to actions brought by bankruptcy trustees;
tithes would still be susceptible to state law attacks by creditors in
non-bankruptcy situations, unless each state also amended its
fraudulent transfer statute.1 4
The larger issues involve whether such an exemption is
appropriate, what its scope should be, and what other remedies
might otherwise be suitable. A number of policy questions are
implicated: Should all charities be protected? Should, as has been
suggested, an exemption be created exclusively for religious
contributions? Is it appropriate for debtors to make charitable
contributions when insolvent?
A. Should There Be an Exception for Charities?
As discussed above," an obligation to disgorge contributions
that prove to be constructively fraudulent would be quite burden-
some to many non-profit organizations. While larger charities, like
the committee in GOP Dinner or private colleges, may have
sufficient cash reserves to respond to such challenges, small non-
profits like local churches or volunteer fire companies tend to
commit what funds they have to their financial needs. A bankrupt-
cy trustee is unlikely to identify and pursue fraudulent conveyances
immediately upon appointment. By the time a charity is notified
that it has received a voidable transfer, two years may have passed
183. President Clinton has indicated that he feels that a legislative response would be
appropriate if the Young decision is affirmed. Thomas, supra note 2.
184. See supra note 53-56 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
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since it received the funds.'86 By that time, the charity will
doubtless have committed, and probably spent, the amount of the
donations.
1. Analogy to Preferences. - On the other hand, a compari-
son could be made to preference actions brought under Section 547
of the Bankruptcy Code. The preference statute voids payments
made by insolvent debtors to their creditors in the ninety days prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, if the payments result in an
improvement of the recipient's position relative to the other
creditors.1" The preference and constructive fraud provisions of
the Code serve similar functions. Both act to ensure that the
creditors as a class are not forced to suffer when an individual
transferee enjoys a windfall. Each strikes to the heart of bankrupt-
cy policy; when a debtor is unable to repay her debts in full, the
only equitable resolution is to ensure that the burden of that
186. For example, the debtor in Missionary Baptist filed its chapter eleven petition in
October of 1980. Missionary Baptist, 24 B.R. at 975. The bankruptcy court decision finding
that the debtor's transfers to the defendant charity were not fraudulent was issued in
November of 1982.
A bankruptcy trustee may bring an action under the avoidance powers for two years
after the filing of the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1994).
187. Id. § 547. The preference statute provides:
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider;
and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
Id. § 547(b). Transfers are not avoidable as preferences if they are: (1) contemporaneous
exchanges for new value; (2) made in the ordinary course of business; (3) merely the
perfection of a prior secured debt; (4) followed by an advance of new value by creditor to
debtor; (5) the perfection of a secured interest in inventory or receivables; (6) the fixing of
a nonavoidable statutory lien; or (7) under $600 and made by an individual debtor for a
consumer debt. Id. § 547(c).
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inability is borne equally by all parties."8 Just as no one creditor
may benefit from a relatively larger payback on its claims than the
others (a preference), no transferee should benefit from a gift from
the debtor when the creditors are being asked to accept little or no
payment on their claims.
Both statutes place a similar burden on the recipient of a
voided transfer. While it seems onerous and unfair to the transfer-
ee to have to give back the funds when it has done nothing wrong,
it would be even more unfair to other creditors to ask them to
forgo their claims while the transferee keeps its windfall. If
anything, the voiding of constructively fraudulent transfers is easier
to justify than preferences, particularly when the fraudulent
conveyance is gratuitous. Unlike the creditors, the transferee has
expended no labor or risk in exchange1 89 for the money it got
from the debtor."9 Disgorging the fraudulent conveyance may be
burdensome for the transferee, but it was, after all, a gift. The
indignation of a donee at having to return a gift wrongfully given
can be no greater than the indignation of a preference creditor at
having to return what little payment it has been able to eke out of
the debtor.'9
2. Analogy to Charitable Immunity. - A further analogy to
the history of charities' immunity from tort liability might also be
considered. Prior to the twentieth century, charities were generally
immune from liability for the torts of their employees and
agents. 92  This immunity has been largely abrogated by the
188. See id. §§ 726(b), 1123(a)(4),1322(a)(3) (providing for equal distribution to similarly
classified creditors).
189. "Exchange" being used here in a strict "exchange for new value" sense.
190. Professor Carlson argues that this outcome is appropriate from an economic point
of view, since donees, unlike creditors, have not worked for their stake in the debtor's estate,
and therefore have not contributed to the public wealth. Carlson, supra note 119, at 673-74.
This thesis is more convincing when applied to donees who receive personal gifts than to
donees who receive charitable contributions. While non-profits may not contribute to the
public wealth from an economist's point of view, they quite often contribute to the public
welfare in very significant ways.
191. Anyone who has received a telephone call from a creditor who has just been served
with a preference complaint can attest to this indignation. The creditor is already unhappy
with the fact that the debtor is about to discharge the remaining claim through bankruptcy.
A demand that the creditor give up what payment it has gotten immediately prior to the
bankruptcy is viewed as adding insult to injury.
192. See Annotation, Immunity of Nongovernmental Charity from Liability for Damages
in Tort, 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
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courts of almost every state. 93 While many of the seminal cases
rejecting charitable immunity involve the liability of charitable
hospitals,"9 a number of modern cases hold that a charitable
organization of any sort must be treated like any other institu-
tion." As a number of courts have reasoned, an injury caused
by tortuous conduct is no less painful or disabling to the injured
party when inflicted by a charitable institution." 6  The injured
party should not be compelled to make a de facto contribution to
the charity by absorbing the cost of the injury when a different
defendant would be liable.1" Reasoning that charities, like
others, must place justice before generosity,'9s a number of courts
have found it anomalous that an organization that exists to
dispense charity should be absolved of any obligation to those it
injures.t99
The abandonment of charitable immunity for torts suggests
that the creation of a new immunity for charities as to fraudulent
conveyances would be inappropriate. From the point of view of
creditors, it makes no difference who was the beneficiary of the
debtor's largesse. While a donation to charity may offend the
conscience less than a gift to a family member, both cause an equal
diminution of the debtor's estate. Either way, the creditors'
potential recovery is reduced. When an insolvent makes charitable
donations, she does so at her creditor's expense. It makes no more
sense to compel creditors to underwrite such generosity than it does
to make those injured by tortious conduct absorb the cost of the
charity's operation."°
193. See Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity ofNongovernmental Charities-Mod-
ern Status, 25 A.L.R.4th 517 (1983).
194. E.g., Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Mulliner v.
Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 175 N.W. 699 (Minn. 1920); Nicholson v. Good
Samaritan Hosp., 199 So. 344 (Fla. 1940).
195. E.g., Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 421 P.2d 745, 747 (Idaho 1966); Albritton v.
Neighborhood Ctrs. Assoc. for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ohio 1984); see also
Fairchild, supra note 193.
196. E.g., Bell, 421 P.2d at 747; Albritton, 466 N.E.2d at 870.
197. Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 70 A.2d 230, 235 (Vt. 1950); Friend v. Cove
Methodist Church, Inc., 396 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1964); Albritton, 466 N.E.2d at 870-71.
198. See supra note 11.
199. Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church, 219 N.W. 463, 465 (Minn. 1928);
Albritton, 466 N.E.2d at 870; see also Friend, 396 P.2d at 549.
200. This compelled donation argument is supported by Professor Tabb's thesis that
debtors have a fiduciary obligation as to their creditors. See infra note 206 and accompany-
ing text. Under such reasoning, an insolvent who makes charitable donations is in fact giving
away her creditors' money, which she is holding in trust.
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B. Should Insolvents Be Making Charitable Contributions?
Regardless of our response to the dilemma faced by charities
receiving fraudulent conveyances, a larger policy question remains:
Is it appropriate for insolvent debtors to be making contributions
to charities? The answer to this question underlies the debate over
how to respond to such contributions. While modern fraudulent
conveyance doctrine strives for objectivity,21 and has moved
away from the penal nature of the sixteenth-century Statute of
Elizabeth, 2 2 voiding transfers is still in some way rooted in the
notion that the transfer never should have occurred. Even when
intent to defraud is unnecessary for a conveyance to be deemed
fraudulent, some element of moral or social wrong must be present
for us to be comfortable with the idea that the transfer should be
undone.203
1. Justice Before Generosity. - The underlying principle of
fraudulent conveyance law is that an insolvent must be just before
she is generous.2 4 A constructively fraudulent transfer represents
generosity whether it is purely gratuitous or made for value that is
not reasonably equivalent to the size of the transfer. In either case,
the conveyance is a gift to the extent that the value given exceeds
the consideration received in return. There is nothing wrong with
giving gifts, just as there is nothing wrong with making charitable
donations. Indeed, charitable donations fund many valuable
institutions, ranging from churches to museums to medical re-
search.25 The difficulty arises when funding charities comes into
conflict with a debtor's legal obligations to her creditors. Incurring
debt involves making an affirmative promise to repay. When a
debtor's finances are so reduced that she cannot meet all of her
obligations, she should honor her legal duties before her moral
ones. To paraphrase the words of many debtors (when asked in
the course of preparing bankruptcy petitions how much money they
201. See supra part II.A.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (the Young court's suggestion that the
results in Missionary Baptist and Moses are the product of courts misapplying the law in
order to reach the "right" result).
204. See supra note 11.
205. The favorable tax treatment given to charitable donations and gifts affirms our
society's belief that such transfers are in the public interest and should be encouraged. See
I.R.C. §§ 102, 170 (West 1994).
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give each month to charitable causes): an insolvent debtor is a
charitable cause.
Professor Charles J. Tabb argues than an insolvent debtor
holds her unencumbered assets in trust for the benefit of her
creditors.2" In this sense, creditors have an equitable interest in
the debtor's property. The inappropriate or inequitable diminution
of that property represents a compromise of the creditors' interests.
The debtor-as-trustee certainly will not be held to such a high duty
that she cannot expend money for her daily sustenance, but it
seems fair to demand that she curtail her discretionary spending.
2. Analogy to Sections 1325 and 707(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code. - The difficult question then becomes whether charitable
contributions may be included in those expenses necessary for the
debtor to sustain herself. Courts and commentators have discussed
this issue at some length in the context of the inclusion of tithing
in a debtor's chapter 7 or chapter 13 budget.2' A debtor at-
tempting to restructure her affairs under chapter 13 of the Code
must commit to her plan of reorganization all income not reason-
ably necessary for her maintenance and support.2' A similar
requirement has been inferred for chapter 7 debtors under Section
707(b)'s provision for dismissal for substantial abuse.' The test
for the appropriateness of expenses in the debtor's budget is the
same under both sections: Are the expenses listed reasonably
necessary for the maintenance and support of the debtor and her
dependents?
210
Courts are divided over the treatment of tithing in debtors'
budgets. While a few have held that religious contributions may
206. Charles J. Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REV. 981, 991-92 (1992).
207. E.g., James Rodenberg, Comment, Reasonably Necessary Expenses or Life of Riley?
The Disposable Income Test and a Chapter 13 Debtor's Lifestyle, 56 Mo. L. REV. 617 (1991);
Leonard J. Long, Religious Exercise as Credit Risk, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 119 (1994); Bruce
Edward Kosub & Susan K. Thompson, The Religious Debtor's Conviction to Tithe as the
Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1988). A number of articles also
discuss the constitutional implications of this issue. See infra note 224.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) (1994).
209. Id. § 707(b). Courts have interpreted substantial abuse to mean that the debtor has
sufficient income to fund a chapter 13 plan. Fonder v. United States, 974 F.2d 996 (8th Cir.
1992); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
But see In re Green, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying a totality of the circumstances
approach).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
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constitute reasonably necessary expenses, 21 a number of decisions
at least partially limit a debtor's freedom to tithe.2 12 It is clear
that the bankruptcy court, in considering a debtor's budget, should
not expect the debtor to live on bread and water for the duration
of her plan, but the budget should indicate that the debtor is not
living extravagantly.23 If the debtor asks her creditors to sacrifice
by accepting a loss on their claims against her, she should be
willing to accept a concomitant sacrifice in her lifestyle; in deter-
mining what constitutes a reasonably necessary expense, "'reason-
able' means 'adequate' but not 'first-class.' 214  While basic
expenses like rent and food are clearly essential, expenses that go
to the debtor's emotional and spiritual health are more debatable.
In this context, tithing might arguably fall into a category of
unnecessary (or limitable) expenses such as long-distance telephone
calls or recreational activities.
215
Of course, attending church is not recreation for a religious
debtor. The crucial distinction is rather between discretionary and
non-discretionary expenses. The debtor has no choice but to
purchase food sufficient to feed herself and her family; the debtor
can choose to give less to charity.
216
211. E.g., In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 283
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); In re Green, 73 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
212. E.g., In re Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. 369, 374-75 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994); In re Curry, 77
B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Lee, 162 B.R. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re
Sturgeon, 51 B.R. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985); In re Breckenridge, 12 B.R. 159 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1980); In re Reynolds, 83 B.R. 684 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (limiting permissible
contributions to 3%); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (following
Reynolds 3% rule); see also In re Lynn (Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv.), 168 B.R. 693
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (10% tithe not an appropriate expense in considering dischargeability
of student loan).
213. "Chapter 13 debtors are not required to live at a poverty level." In re Anderson,
143 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) (limiting to $150 debtors' monthly discretionary
expenses); see also In re Gaskins, 85 B.R. 846 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (new car); In re Bell,
56 B.R. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 65 B.R. 575 (luxury car,
eating in restaurants); In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (excessive recreation
expenses); In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (boat).
214. In re Easley (Nelson v. Easley), 72 B.R. 948,949 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987); see also
In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615, 622 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) ("A chapter 13 debtor who proposes
to pay his creditors 38 cents on the dollar cannot expect to 'go first class' when 'coach' is
available.").
215. See Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. at 374-75; Anderson, 143 B.R. at 721.
216. Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. at 374-75 (treating tithing as part of a class of discretionary
expenses, along with contributions to a 401K retirement plan, "modest dinners out," and
newspapers); see also In re Lynn (Lynn v. Diversified Collection Serv.), 168 B.R. 693, 696
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (debtor seeking to have student loans discharged due to hardship
1995]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
A few courts have resolved this issue through compromise, by
permitting as reasonable tithes at three percent of debtor's in-
come.117 While it may be difficult in theory to apply such a rule
to alleged fraudulent conveyances,2" 8 a similar solution is doubt-
less already in force on a practical level; small (i.e. "reasonable")
pre-bankruptcy charitable contributions are not attacked as
fraudulent simply because not enough money is at stake to justify
the legal expense involved. The parallel ceases to work, of course,
when the debtor's income is so high that three percent represents
a substantial dollar figure. In such circumstances, a contribution
that would satisfy the three percent rule under Section 1325 might
nonetheless be large enough to merit attack as fraudulent.
2 19
A three percent rule may be an appealing solution to the
fraudulent charitable donation problem. It is fair to ask the debtor
to make sacrifices when possible to maximize the funds available
to her creditors. An outright ban on religious or other charitable
giving would be an excessive imposition on the debtor's life. After
all, if debtors may include reasonable recreation expenses in their
budgets, 2 ° they should also be allowed some other discretionary
spending. Nonetheless, some restriction on amount does seem
just.22t  The difficulty with the three percent rule as a formal
solution arises due to its incompatibility with the language of
Section 548. Unlike the preference statute, Section 548 contains no
under 11 U.S,C. § 523(a)(8)(B) "testified that at times, she went without food because of her
commitment to tithe."); supra note 137 (debtor in Missionary Baptist wrote bad payroll
checks while continuing to make substantial charitable donations).
217. E.g., In re Reynolds, 83 B.R. 684 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R.
644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); see also In re Anderson, 143 B.R. 719 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992)
(limiting to $150 debtors' monthly discretionary spending, including church contributions);
In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (permitting reduced tithing); In re
Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (permitting some level of religious giving).
218. There is no basis for finding that a conveyance is not fraudulent merely because it
is small.
219. Of course, since the debtor must be insolvent for the transfer to be constructively
fraudulent, 11 U.S.C. § 548(b)(i), and since insolvency is generally determined under the
Code by a balance sheet test, id. § 101(32), the transfers will likely represent less than three
percent of outstanding claims. After deduction of the trustee's commission and legal fees,
this might not yield a sufficient dividend to justify pursuit.
220. E.g., In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513, 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (under § 707(b));
In re Schyma, 68 B.R. 52, 64 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (under § 1325); In re Struggs, 71 B.R.
96, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (under § 707(b)); see also Rodenberg, supra note 207, at
648-53.
221. For an overview of the constitutional issues implicated, see infra part III.C.
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exemption for small transactions, 22 nor does it authorize judicial
acceptance of "reasonably necessary" expenditures.21 The
introduction of such an exception for modest contributions must
come from Congress.
C The Special Problem of Religious Charities
When the charitable contribution under attack as fraudulent is
religious in nature, significant constitutional issues are implicated.
A detailed discussion of such issues is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but a brief overview is in order.224 The First Amend-
ment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of ... , 2'5  Treatment of tithes as fraudulent conveyances has
been challenged under both the establishment and free exercise
clauses.
226
1. The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. - The
present state of the law on free exercise is complex. In 1990, the
Supreme Court limited the application of strict scrutiny analysis of
laws that infringe upon religion in Employment Division v.
Smith.2 7 In response to the Smith decision, Congress in 1993
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,2 s or RFRA,
which expressly restores the protection of strict scrutiny to religious
activity burdened by government actions." The relationship
between RFRA and the Supreme Court's First Amendment
222. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(8) exempts from preference avoidance transfers by consumer
debtors under $600.
223. See supra part III.B.2.
224. For a discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding the inclusion of tithes in a
debtor's budget, see Long, supra note 57; Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Distributing
the First Fruits: Statutory and Constitutional Implications of Tithing in Bankruptcy, 26 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 853 (1993); Carol Koenig, Comment, To Tithe or Not To Tithe: The
Constitutionality of Tithing in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Budget, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1231 (1992).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
226. E.g., In re Newman (Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1995); In re Young (Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church), 152 B.R. 939 (D.
Minn. 1993); In re Moses (Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc.), 59 B.R. 815
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); see also In re Green, 73 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd,
103 B.R. 852 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (under § 1325); In re Lee, 162 B.R. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1993) (under § 707(b)).
227. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
228. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
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jurisprudence is unclear. Under Marbury v. Madison,"3 the
Court is still the sole arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution;
RFRA appears to give an individual who feels that her religious
freedom is being imposed upon a separate, statutory cause of
action.231
Under Smith, a "valid and neutral law of general applicability"
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.23 2 An individual may
not claim an exemption from a law that is valid as to the rest of
society, merely because it happens to burden her religious exercise.
The defendants in Smith, for example, were not free from the
operation of a state law banning the use of peyote on the grounds
that the use was mandated by their religion.23
A direct application of Smith suggests that treatment of tithing
by insolvents as constructively fraudulent does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. The Bankruptcy Code is neutral towards religious
practice in general; fraudulent conveyance doctrine does not single
out religious contributions, but instead treats all voluntary convey-
ances as voidable. Just such a result was reached by the Young
court, which ruled that Section 548's effect on religion, like that of
the ban on peyote in Smith, was incidental, and therefore not an
imposition on free exercise. 234  Even when the debtor's religion
mandates tithing (as does, for example, the Mormon faith), the
incidental effect on the debtor of fraudulent conveyance treatment
is not a violation of First Amendment rights.
RFRA was drafted in response to the Smith decision.35
RFRA applies a strict scrutiny test to any law that burdens religion,
regardless of its neutrality.236  A law that burdens religion is
impermissible unless the government can demonstrate that: (1) the
law furthers a compelling governmental interest; and (2) the law is
230. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
231. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACrs § 5.03[3][a] (3d ed. 1995);
see also Newman, 183 B.R. at 249-52 (applying the Free Exercise clause and RFRA
separately). It has been suggested that, under Marbury, RFRA is unconstitutional.
Kimberly A. Taylor, Recent Decision: Constitutional Law, 32 Duo. L. REV. 915, 937-38
(1994). But see SMOLLA, supra at § 5.03[3][a].
232. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
233. Id.
234. Young, 152 B.R. at 953-54; see also Newman, 183 B.R. at 250; Cavanaugh, 175 B.R.
at 374.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 200bb(a).
236. Id. § 200bb-1.
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the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.237  Courts
have found in the past that the administration of bankrupts' estates
is a compelling government interest.238  If establishment of
bankruptcy policy is, in broad terms, a compelling governmental
interest, then the equitable distribution of assets, including drawing
voluntary conveyances into the estate for the benefit of creditors,
must likewise pass the RFRA test.239 Alternative means of
preventing diminution of a debtor's estate, such as a prohibition on
charitable giving, would be both more restrictive and more difficult
to administrate.
Proponents of the application of RFRA will doubtless argue
that there are other, less restrictive ways of administering the
estates of bankrupts. 24° For example, Congress could broaden the
denial of discharge provisions of Section 737 to discourage pre-
bankruptcy transfers.241 Such a remedy would avoid the burden
upon religious organizations that a Section 548 action represents;
it would not, however, avoid the burden placed upon the debtor's
religious practices. Alternatively, Congress could adopt an
exception for modest transfers, similar to the three percent rule
followed by some courts with regard to chapter 13 debtors'
237. Id. § 200bb-1(b). RFRA expressly restores pre-Smith jurisprudence, providing that:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of burden to that person-
(1) is in furtherance of an compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
Id.
238. E.g., Newman, 183 B.R. at 251 (decided under RFRA; holding that Section 548
serves a compelling government interest); In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 648 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994) (decided under RFRA); Young, 152 B.R. at 954; In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 353
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
Senator Orin Hatch, one of the co-sponsors of RFRA, has indicated that he feels that
Young represents just the sort of situation RFRA was designed to address. 140 CONG. REC.
S5014-01, S5015 (1994). The Department of Justice had originally filed an amicus brief with
the Eighth Circuit in the Young appeal, supporting the trustee on the bankruptcy law issues.
The White House subsequently ordered the brief withdrawn, basing its reversal on the
proposed application of RFRA to the case. Religion: Administration Withdraws Brief in
Case Pitting Trustee Against Debtor's Church, BNA BANKRUPTCY LAW DAILY, Sept. 20,
1994.
239. See Newman, 183 B.R. at 251-52 (holding that the voiding of tithes as fraudulent
conveyances does not violate RFRA.).
240. See Michael M. Duclos, A Debtor's Right to Tithe in Bankruptcy Under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 665 (1995).
241. See infra part III.D.
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budgets." While a three percent rule represents a practical
compromise between the interests at stake, it does little to avoid
the burdens of cases like Young. As discussed above,243 few
trustees will bring a fraudulent conveyance action when the transfer
in question is very small relative to the outstanding claims; such a
de minimis rule offers no solace to churches that have received and
spent large contributions.
2. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause. - The
Supreme Court recently described the relationship between
government and religion as one that must be inherently neutral:
"'A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Free
Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of
'neutrality' toward religion,' favoring neither one religion over
others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents."24
It is this emphasis on neutrality that makes the creation of an
exemption for tithing from fraudulent conveyance attack problem-
atic. An exclusion that protects churches but not secular charities
would be an impermissible preference of religion. By the same
token, an exclusion that treats differently tithes by members of
churches that mandate contribution (like Mormons) from tithes by
those for whom giving is optional, would be preferential treatment
of one belief over another.245
The Establishment Clause may, on the other hand, be raised
as a defense by churches against fraudulent conveyance actions.
Prior to 1994, the Court followed a three-part test to determine
whether governmental action violates the establishment clause: to
pass constitutional muster, a statute must (1) have a secular
purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) not foster excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.21 It is presently unclear whether this ap-
proach survives, or whether it has been replaced by the totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis employed by the Court in its Kiryas Joel
242. See supra part III.B.2.
243. See supra text accompanying note 219.
244. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2487 (1994) (quoting
Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973))
(citations omitted).
245. Id. (creation of school district for benefit of Hasidic Jewish sect violates Establish-
ment Clause).
246. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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decision. 247  If the three-prong analysis endures, there appears to
be little basis under it for the protection of tithes. The Bankruptcy
Code certainly has a secular purpose, and the primary effect of
voiding fraudulent conveyances is neutral towards religion.2
There is authority for the proposition that the government may
impose financial burdens on religious organizations without
excessive entanglement. 24 9 Likewise under a Kiryas Joel totality
analysis, favoring religious over secular giving by creating an.
exception would represent a greater violation of the Establishment
Clause than does the treatment of charitable contributions as
constructively fraudulent.
3. Exemptions. - A related insight into the Code's
treatment of religion may be found in the exemptions it grants to
a debtor. It has been suggested that one of the reasons that the
law has traditionally exempted certain property of a debtor from
attachment by her creditors is the protection of the debtor's dignity,
culture, and religious identity.2" A number of states, therefore,
exempt such property as family pictures, wedding rings, books,
seats occupied in places of worship, and Bibles.2" While the
Bankruptcy Code exempts jewelry 2 and household goods, 3 it
provides no separate exemption for religious items such as Bibles.
It may be than no larger meaning should be inferred from this;
Congress may have assumed that religious items such as Bibles
would be exempted along with household goods.' Such a
specific exemption may have been avoided, in fact, out of a concern
that a blanket protection of religious items would violate the
247. See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498-2500 (O'Connor, concurring); Patricia A. Brannan
& Daniel B. Kohrman, Commentary: The 1993-94 Term of the United States Supreme Court
and its Impact on Public Schools, 93 ED. L. REP. 1, 8 (1994).
248. See Young, 152 B.R. at 955; Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. at 374.
249. E.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 396 (1990)
(sales & use tax); South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991); see also Young, 152 B.R. at 955 (suggesting that
trying set a cash value on the spiritual benefits of tithing would be excessive entanglement).
250. Resnick, supra note 103, at 623-24.
251. Id.
252. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(4) (1994).
253. Id. § 522(d)(3).
254. Section 522(d)(3)'s exemption of $8,000 worth of household goods per debtor, at
distressed-sale values, is ample to protect the personal property of most individual debtors.
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Establishment Clause.255 The absence of such an exemption,
however, may represent a decision by Congress to treat religion in
a neutral manner under the Code. The message implied is that the
debtor's religious beliefs, to the extent that they are manifested in
tangible and economic ways, must bear the burden of insolvency
and bankruptcy along with the secular aspects of the debtor's life.
D. An Alternative Solution: Denial of Discharge for Gross
Fiscal Negligence
Since voiding an irresponsible transfer may, in some cases, be
inequitable as to the transferee, an alternative remedy might focus
on the debtor. The Code provides for denial of discharge when the
debtor has made transfers with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors.256 One solution to the problem of irresponsible
transfers that are made in good faith, and that are not constructive-
ly fraudulent (such as the hypothetical trip to Paris), might be an
expansion of this dischargeability provision. Discharge could be
denied when the debtor's actions rise to the level of gross negli-
gence. If we accept Professor Tabb's proposition that the debtor
has a fiduciary duty to her creditors,257 then irresponsible spend-
ing would represent a breach of this duty. The Code might be
amended to deny discharge when the debtor was negligent as to
her responsibility to her creditors.
While such a remedy would not increase the funds available to
creditors from the bankruptcy estate, it would allow creditors to
preserve their claims against the debtor. In theory, a debtor comes
out of bankruptcy with no assets left for creditors, but in actuality,
most creditors would regard a preservation of their claims as
preferable to discharge. Many state exemption statutes are less
generous than the bankruptcy exemptions, so it is possible for a
debtor to emerge from bankruptcy with assets that potentially
would be subject to attachment or levy under state law. Further,
if the debtor's circumstances subsequently improve, the creditors
can pursue their claims via attachment of wages or levy of newly
obtained property.
255. The constitutionality of state-law exemptions for Bibles does not appear to have
been tested.
256. 11 U.S.C. § 737(a)(2).
257. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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Although this remedy would offer some solace to creditors, it
is unlikely to have very much deterrent effect. Most debtors are
not aware of the intricacies of the Bankruptcy Code in the months
prior to filing; while a denial of discharge for negligence might
prevent irresponsible spending by those debtors who seek advice of
counsel, those who are not so well informed may continue to spend
unwisely, and face (with surprise) the burdensome consequences.
Addition of negligent spending to the denial of discharge
provision also raises the question of what spending would be
considered negligent. We may be able to agree that the luxury
vacation in Paris deserves censure, but are we going to examinine
the merits of each purchase, of each tank of gas? How will we
treat charitable contributions? We can argue that voiding a
constructively fraudulent conveyance is not punishment, but is
merely equitable reallocation of assets; a denial of discharge
provision is unquestionably punitive. Are we prepared to say that
the failure to place justice before generosity is so irresponsible as
to merit punishment?
IV. Conclusion
A principle of shared sacrifice is essential to our bankruptcy
policy. Creditors must sacrifice by accepting reduced payment, or
no payment, on their claims. Debtors must sacrifice by devoting
non-exempt property and excess income to the repayment of their
obligations. These sacrifices must be shared fairly. Thus, preferen-
tial treatment of certain creditors is prohibited,258 and general
unsecured creditors must share the assets of the estate in equal
proportion.259
As a matter of prudence, an insolvent debtor should cut back
on discretionary spending, such as entertainment and charitable
giving, in order to devote her limited resources to paying back her
debts. Once she asks the courts for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code, such fiscal restraint must become a matter of policy. We can
not fairly ask creditors to sacrifice their financial interests when the
debtor has no obligation to make sacrifices in her lifestyle. It
defies logic to suggest that a law that relieves debtors of their legal
obligations should not also have some impact on their moral
obligations.
258. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
259. Id. §§ 726(a)(2), 1123(a)(4), 1322(a)(3).
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This is not to suggest that charitable giving is against public
policy, or even against public policy for debtors. The charitable
giving of insolvents and bankrupts, however, ought to be limited to
giving at a reasonable level. A debtor's spiritual existence may be
enhanced by any number of discretionary expenditures: tithing,
giving money to the homeless, going on vacation. Bankruptcy is
not intended to place a debtor in a state of indentured servitude,
on a bread-and-water diet, but it does inherently ask the debtor to
make certain sacrifices. Generosity is certainly laudable, but justice
must come first.
Robert J. Bein
